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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this monograph is to contribute to a wide ranging discussion concerning
the appropriate roles and strategies for union leaders -- at a time when labor and industrial
relations have been undergoing fundamental changes. Our approach is both descriptive and
prescriptive. We discuss a broad variety of different situations in which labor leaders find
themselves, and we identify the range of responses they are adopting, often on a trial and
error basis, to cope with their new environment. We also propose some strategies and
perspectives which we hope will help labor leaders cope more effectively with the challenges
they confront today.
This is clearly a turbulent period for union leaders. To represent their members
effectively, many find themselves engaged with management in a dialogue regarding decisions
about employee participation, new technology. new forms of work organization, human resource
policies, plant locations, and even the very legitimacy of unions. There are few models
suggesting how to engage these issues. Yet there is a pressing need for such models. One of
the most basic reasons for this is that even union leaders who choose to pursue issues of
joint concern with management must also be able to maintain their independence as the
representatives of those rank-and-file interests that are in opposition to management.
As union leaders develop new roles and functions to complement and sometimes replace
the old, these shifts often produce deep conflicts within unions hierarchies, as well as between
union leaders and their members. Nonetheless, one of the central conclusions reached in our
research is that if unions are to adapt successfully to today's industrial relations environment,
union leaders will need to fashion and to fulfill a variety of the new roles and functions
discussed in this report. In turn, we also see successful union adaptation as a necessary
condition for the diffusion and institutionalization of the industrial relations innovations
analyzed in this research.
The experiences discussed in this report are drawn from a panel of nine companies and
more than a dozen associated local and international unions. These parties participated in a
two-year study conducted with the support of the 1I.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
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Management Relations and Cooperative Programs. The purpose of this study was to assess the
staying power of important innovations in industrial relations. The cases were selected for the
panel because in each we found one or more of the types of innovations that seem to
challenge the prevailing principles of the New Deal system of industrial relations. The most
fundamental features of that industrial relations system included the centrality of formal and
periodic collective bargaining as the proper forum for labor-management relations; the use of
formal grievance procedures to resolve disputes concerning the administration of the collective
bargaining contract between negotiations; and the tacit agreement that strategic managerial
discussions and the organization of work on the shop floor be left exclusively to managers,
with little if any involvement (or interference) on the part of workers or union leaders. The
cases we examine here all deviate from one or more of these New Deal norms. Though they
by no means comprise a random or even a representative sample, they do illustrate some of
the different avenues by which the parties can adjust their relationships.
The specific sites studied and the nature of the changes occurring in each are outlined
below.
The United Automobile Workers Union (UA\W) and General Motors (GM)
Our focus in this case was on the new Ficro and Lake Orion assembly plants, both of
which feature a fundamental reorganization of the work design. The roles of labor and
management have also been significantly modified in these plants, affording workers
greater autonomy, less supervision, and, in the case of Fiero, union representation in all
plant-level strategic and administrative decisions. I)uring our research the union and
company also engaged in the joint design and creation of the Saturn Corporation, and
the GM plant in Freemont, California, was re-opened (after a two-year shutdown) as a
joint venture with Toyota. We followed several aspects of these developments as well.
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (A(lTWUF) and Xerox:
The experiences of the seven plants in Xerox's home manufacturing complex (in
Rochester, New York) show how a narrowly focused quality circle initiative can evolve to
encompass multiple forms of employee participation which are then reinforced by
contractual language assuring a no-layoff guarantee, joint decision making on outsourcing,
and gainsharing. The parties have also built on a history of informal consultation about
str.zgic issues with the establishment of joint "horizon" planning committees dealing
wik' uman resource management issues, the joint design of a new manufacturing facility,
an, iBnion involvement in new product development.
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Western Airlines and the Airline Pilots Association (AI,PA), the International Association of
Machinists (IAM), the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), and the Air Transport
Fmployees (ATE)
Economic pressures led Western to demand concessions from all four unions. Though
each of the negotiations was different, all four unions ultimately emerged with significant
minority stock ownership (initially 33%), a profit sharing plan, seats on the board of
directors, and, in one case, an agreement to pursue United employee participation in
daily decisions. Of particular interest is the great variation in the strategies pursued by
the four unions.
The International Association of Machinists (AM) and the Bocing Corporation
Rapid advances in manufacturing technology led the union to push for joint roles in the
exploration, selection, and implementation of new technology. The operation of the joint
structure that.evolved over the course of two contract cycles in Boeing's Seattle,
Washington facility and a parallel quality circle effort were the focus of this research.
The Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (ABGR(W ) and Alcoa
At rolling mill, operating in a highly competitive portion of the aluminum industry, the
parties tried to maintain employee involvement activities and work re-organization during
a period of major wage and benefit concessions. The concessions reflect the
decentralization of bargaining in the industry. We explore the consequences within the
local union.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the Budd Company:
The parties have sought to sustain employee involvement initiatives, quality control
improvements and limited just-in-time delivery.TlIhese changes were prompted by customer
pressure in the context of the highly competitive auto supply industry. During the
period of our research there were efforts to link plant-level participative activities to
cooperation at the corporate/international union level. Also, one local negotiated an
agreement to accept significant work rule reforms and the use of a team concept
approach to work organization, in return for reinvestment in its facilities.
The Diesel Workers Unions (DWU) and the Office and Clerical Unit (OCU) and Cummins
Engine:
After nearly a decade of experimentation with the design of non-union facilities based on
socio-technical principles, the parties are now in the process of trying to integrate these
innovations into the company's unionized, home manufacturing complex. We followed the
diffusion of new systems for the organization of work, as well as related changes in
collective bargaining, as they evolved throughout a period of layoffs and corporate
management turnover.
The United Paperworkers International Union (IJPIU) and Boise Cascade Corporation
Two decades of low performance in the company's newest and largest facility -- rooted,
at least partly, in an increasingly complex set of work rules -- led to company demands
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for a sweeping revision of the contract and its hundreds of attached memorandums of
agreement. After a lengthy strike, the company prevailed and imposed a contract with
only four job classifications, a team-based and flexible work organization, a no lay-off
pledge covering current employees and substantial wage increases for those affected by
the job classification changes. Critical questions concern the implementation and
evolution of such changes when imposed via "hard bargaining".
The United Rubber Workers Union (URW) and Goodyear Corporation:
Gradually, over about ten years, the parties have made a series of incremental changes in
the organization of work and the structure of union-management relations in their
Lincoln, Nebraska facility. We are particularly interested in the process and results of
such plant-level incremental changes.
I ongitudinal case studies were conducted for each site by one or more members of our
research team. Interviews ranging in number from fifteen to over one hundred were
conducted in each case. In some of the cases we were also able to draw on previous case
studies or related research from our earlier work. Employee surveys were conducted in three
cases (Western, Boeing, and Xerox) and in one case (Boise Cascade) we were able to conduct a
formal analysis of the economic effects of the changes introduced.
This study is based on discussions with hundreds of labor leaders at both the local and
national levels of the unions involved in our case studies, as well as a wide range of contacts
with other labor leaders.
I.1. Analytic Framework
Our study draws heavily on the analytic framework contained in Kochan, Katz and
McKersie's (1986) The Transformation of American Industrial Relations . That study
documents and evaluates fundamental changes occurring in all areas of industrial relations.
This model, which we also apply in this work, consists of three "tiers" or "levels" of industrial
relations activity: the workplace level, the collective bargaining level and the strategic
management level. In Transformation, as in this work, great emphasis is placed on the inter-
relationship of changes in the nature of labor-management relations -- and thus the roles of
union leaders -- at these three levels. At the work place there are strong competitive
pressures to increase flexibility, improve quality, increase labor participation, and establish
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new patterns of authority and governance. At the collective bargaining level we observe the
negotiation of contingent compensation mechanisms, and the polarization of labor-management
relations between highly adversarial bargaining, on the one hand, and increased problem
solving throughout the term of a contract on the other. At the strategic level, patterns of
labor-management interaction are similarly mixed: in some circumstances there are
fundamental challenges to the legitimacy of unions, while in others we observe union leaders
gaining unprecedented access to management decision making.
The plan of this monograph is to start with the middle tier of the industrial relations
system -- collective bargaining -- since this is familiar territory for labor leaders. We then
examine developments at the two frontiers: the work place and the strategic levels.
II. UNION I,EADERSIIIP AND COI,ECTIVE BARGAINING
The emergence of widespread "concession bargaining" in the early 1980s and the related
decentralization of bargaining in many industries struck at the very core of the power and
structure of American unions. This is because U.S. unions have traditionally represented their
member's interests through collective bargaining (especially through the ability to take wages
out of competition) rather than through the exertion of political power or via
labor-management collaboration. The implications of these recent changes in collective
bargaining go well beyond the substantial decline in the average rate of growth in union
wages.
For example, ILocal 445 of the Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (ABGWU), was
pressured to break away from the national pattern agreement in the aluminum industry in 1983
because the products (aluminum foil and fin stock) made at the Lebanon plant are in one of
the most competitive portions of the aluminum industry. The workers ultimately agreed to
accept nearly three dollars an hour in wage concessions. Ever since, this issue of concessions
has dominated relations between local leaders and the membership, between the local union
and the international, and between the union and the company. This experience is typical of
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many companies and unions during the early 1980s, when over half of all major agreements
included roll-backs in wages and benefits (Mitchell, 1986; Cullen 1985).
In some cases pattern bargaining has even turned into what might be termed pattern
concessions or reverse pattern bargaining. Consider, for example, the rounds of concessions
that have occurred after deregulation in the airline industry. The whipsaw tactic of playing
one employer against another, which had been used by these and other unions in the past, was
now being used against the unions, leading to deep and successive cuts in wages and benefits,
as well as a loosening of work rules.
The purpose of this section of the paper is to explore the possibilities open to union
leaders facing such difficult circumstances. Three themes emerge here. First, management is
increasingly aggressive in taking the initiative in negotiations (so as to lower costs and
increase flexibility in the utilization of resources). We explore union responses to these
initiatives. Second, the nature of collective bargaining has in many cases shifted from
primarily zero-sum processes to a mixture of zero-sum and positive-sum (or integrative)
processes. ('T'hese types of bargaining are called 'distributive' and "integrative" by Walton and
McKersie (1965); we will use these terms as we proceed.) Third, there is a growing
divergence in expectations across different levels within union organizations. It is thus
important to explore what kind of modus operandi for unions can embrace this diversity while
still proving effective in dealings with management. It will be noted that all three of these
thematic developments reflect an overall decline in unions' bargaining leverage vis-a-vis
management.
11.1. The Shift of Initiative to Management
It is by now well documented that unionized employers are frequently pressing for
smaller increases or even reductions in wages, fringe benefits, and other contract terms
(Cappelli, 1985). The old adage that "the union proposes and management disposes' is now
being turned on its head. Less visible, but perhaps more significant, is the fact that many
managers systematically target investment dollars for non-union facilities and pursue human
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resource strategies designed to build employee commitment and keep their facilities non-union
(Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986; Verma 1983). The growth of non-union human
resource strategies and their spill-over into labor-management relations in unionized settings
effectively reverses the shock effect" that unions had on the non-union sector in the 1950s
(Slichter, Healy and Livernash, 1960; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986).
An extreme case of the reverse shock effect occurred in the 1982 negotiations between
the Boise Cascade Company and the Paperworkers Union at the company's newest and largest
mill in DeRidder, Louisiana. The union had historically resisted company proposals for
incremental changes in a complex set of work rules and detailed contract language. n 1982
the company sought to replace these with a highly simplified work organization based on
teams and including only four job classifications. These work rule changes were linked to
substantial wage increases associated with the combining of classifications. Still, the union
opposed the unilateral imposition of such a fundamentally different contract. A seven-month
strike ensued after which the employees returned to work to avoid losing their jobs.
Moreover, the workers then elected an entirely new slate of union leaders. This case suggests
how employers can change the work system through hard bargaining while simultaneously
altering -- fundamentally -- relations with the union. Ilad the union been strong enough to
sustain the strike, the outcome might have been very different.
Certain unions have been able to resist such employer initiatives with lengthy strikes,
consumer boycotts, and the application of indirect strategic levers or "corporate campaigns."
While these activities have proven important responses to employers bent on violating the law,
their utility is limited for three main reasons. First, the prevailing social, legal, and economic
climate is not sympathetic to concerted activity by unions. Union leaders therefore turn to
these activities only as a last recourse. Second, because these activities are then waged on
an all or nothing" basis, they may polarize a relationship so as to bar integrative relations
for years. Third, union leaders facing this kind of threat may well lack the power to be able
to counter management in this domain.
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n.2 New Issues at The Table:
Some unions have proposed safeguards against the worst repercussions of wage and work
organization changes, along with the institution of various quid pro quos. For example, the
political dangers of two-tier wage schedules might be mitigated by insistence on eventual
parity. On this issue, the Air Line Pilots Association has made it a matter of policy to insist
that all negotiated two-tier scales be "merging scales", and was even willing to sustain a
bitter strike at United Airlines mainly in defense of this principle in 1985.
A similar use of safeguards is evident in the approach adopted by the UAW in its 1982
negotiations, when it insisted that its annual three percent improvement factor not be
eliminated, but only suspended. Another common quid pro quo for concessions has been profit
sharing. Many major airlines have introduced profit sharing programs since the
post-deregulation economic crisis in that industry. F[inally, unions have often exchanged wage
and/or work rule flexibility for employment security guarantees, discussed in greater detail
below. What these approaches have in common is an attempt to translate concessions of one
sort or another into new kinds of "collective goods" (in the form of guarantees) for members.
Some union leaders are also able to use their leverage at the collective bargaining table
to establish new and broader roles at the workplace or at the strategic level of management.
During the 1984 concession negotiations at Western Airlines the four main unions were
granted, as quid pro quos for concessions, not just profit sharing and stock ownership, but
also four seats on the board of directors. One union, the Air Transport Employees (ATE),
also negotiated an employee involvement program. Once these potential sources of leverage in
managerial decision making are negotiated, the main task facing the union is to see that the
potential for enhanced influence is actually realized.
In cases involving work rule changes, fewer workers or workers with different skills may
be required. Under such conditions, union leaders may seek employment security guarantees
and retaining programs to protect remaining workers. Examples include the no-layoff
guarantee negotiated by Xerox and ACTWU; the job banks and joint training programs created
by the UAW with Ford and GM; and the lifetime employment security program negotiated by
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the International Union of Electrical Workers and the Packard Electric Products Division of
General Motors.
In all of these cases union leaders have been driven by a loss of traditional bargaining
leverage to expand their activities at the collective bargaining table. They then focus
increasing attention on their member's job security, as well as to the roles they might play
and the leverage they might gain in strategic management and at the workplace level.
Having lost some of their traditional sources of power, these leaders find that collective
bargaining alone cannot -- in itself -- protect their members' interests and respond to new
management challenges. Collective bargaining, therefore, must be linked to union strategies at
these other levels. this is not to say that the importance of collective bargaining is
diminishing. Indeed, we find that it actually is proving an essential forum for codifying and
institutionalizing developments at other levels. What has occurred, instead, is that the nature
of collective bargaining has shifted and the addition of new levels of activity -- both of
which have served to make the task of a union leader more complex.
11.3. The Increasing Importance of Integrative Bargaining
For local and international union leaders involved in collective bargaining it is not only
bargaining outcomes that have changed, but also how bargaining is conducted. For instance,
the negotiation of administrative structures for new programs can be a long, complex, and
politically risky process. In such cases bargaining often takes on an almost continuous
quality, making a reality of the concept Walter Reuther once called the living agreement."
These cases pose difficult strategic and tactical problems for union leaders.
Consider the 1986 negotiations between Xerox and the ACTWU. Formal negotiations were
preceded by frequent formal and informal working sessions. In the actual negotiations, the
two bargaining teams divided up into small, joint problem-solving groups to address
particularly complex issues, and twice engaged in full brainstorming sessions at the main table.
The parties were able by virtue of these processes to reach agreements on the establishment
of a pilot gainsharing program, the redesign of an absentee control program and the extension
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of a no-layoff guarantee. However, the process also affected how the union and management
could exercise leverage at the table. Since both parties highly valued these new programs and
their administration, both were constrained in the use of hard bargaining tactics.
Consequently, the exercise of power in the resolution of bargaining conflicts became much
more subtle.
One political problem with integrative bargaining is that it can be difficult to justify to
members, since it is not always clear whether the union has obtained the best possible bargain
without exerting traditional power tactics. The process is doubly hard to defend when it
encompasses employee involvement, training, and other issues about which members may have
divergent views. Local and international union leaders engaged in these new forms of
bargaining find it necessary to emphasize the importance of regular two-way communications
before, during and after bargaining to keep the members appraised of their efforts anrid of the
merits of the new process. In some cases, this is simply not possible. For instance, the
concession negotiations at Western Airlines in 1984 were conducted in such an atmosphere of
crisis that the union leaders barely had the time to consult their members about the nature of
the participative quid pro quos they negotiated in return for agreeing to wage and work/rule
concessions.
The main function of increased information sharing -- both between labor and
management and between union leaders and members -- is to ground collective bargaining more
on a foundation of objective data. This can be very important in minimizing a return to
adversarial posturing, which can be particularly costly once the parties have tried
collaboration (Parker 1985; Wever 1986: c.f. Hammer & Stein 1986). Specifically, the purpose
of communications and involvement of the rank and file in such decision making is to show
that changes in the terms and conditions of employment were really unavoidable, and did not
result from the co-optation of union negotiators by management.
11.4. Divergent Expectations Across lvels in the Union
Further confounding integrative union strategies at the bargaining table are two sorts of
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intra-organizational conflict; specifically, tensions between the local union and the central
(national or international) organization, and tensions associated with conflicting interests
within the local union (Katz and Sabel, 1985).
The local-national tension may arise when local leaders are willing to grant concessions,
while national leaders object to the erosion of national standards. For example, the national
leadership of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) opposed
all concessions by its airline locals in the early 1980s, and even placed its Braniff Airlines
local in trusteeship when it agreed to concessions. National leaders may recognize the long
term dangers of a downward concession spiral, while local leaders and members (highly
vulnerable to the threat of lost jobs) may be reluctant to challenge management demands for
concessions. The national Air ine Pilots Association (ALPA) leadership began in 1981 to
exhort its locals to reject certain kinds of concessions, and to secure board membership and
other channels of access to strategic decisions in return for concessions. Moreover, in 1984
the national organization reasserted its role as the centralized decision-making authority of
the union through a provision that no contract be binding unless signed by the national
president, and instituting formal policies governing concessions made by its locals.
A somewhat different solution was adopted by the ABGWU. That union allowed the
Lebanon, Pennsylvania local to sign a concessionary settlement that departed from the national
agreement in 1984. However, it was unwilling to allow the local to establish a local
gainsharing program, which would also have departed from the national agreement. In all
three of these cases -- the AM, ALPA and the ABGWU -- intraorganizational tension emerged
as a result of a loss of bargaining power at the local level. In all three cases the national
leadership intervened to prevent what it saw as the possible further erosion of the union's
national power, viz., through management's successive erosion of wage levels across different
locals.
Tensions also developed within the AM over its Technology Bill of Rights, a wide
ranging manifesto about what role the union should play in choosing and dealing with the
consequences of new technology. In this case, it was the development of a new strategic
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approach that engendered intra-organizational conflicts. Specifically, in 1983 the leadership of
the 27,000 member IAM lodge representing Boeing workers negotiated provisions that required
the company to inform the union periodically of upcoming developments in such areas as
flexible machining systems, Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM),
robotics, and composite materials. The parties also agreed to a joint union-management
training committee to help laid-off workers qualify for positions to be created by the new
technology. But the IAM national leadership argued that the Boeing settlement did not go far
enough in establishing worker's rights vis-a-vis new technology, even though local leaders
thought that they had achieved a substantial breakthrough in the face of difficult conditions.
We have also observed conflicts within local unions. Local leaders may have trouble
keeping track of changing member expectations, and they may need to modify the perspective
of the rank and file concerning new union activities. Under the circumstances, the question
becomes what sort of information is properly conveyed by the union, by the management, and
by both partners. At the Xerox main manufacturing complex, the ACTWU has decided in some
plants to establish a formal role for shop chairmen to play in the bi-weekly performance
feedback process for work groups. The union is thus guaranteed some influence over the
regular education of its members.
At Alcoa's Lebanon, Pennsylvania plant the ABnGWU has chosen to participate in
hi-annual briefing sessions, but has not demanded a joint role for stewards in bi-weekly
meetings where supervisors provide work groups with feedback on their performance and
safety records. In this case, the union has decided that it needs to maintain independence
from management's shop floor activities in order to represent members' interests. The
decision also reflects sharp tensions between stewards and shop floor management.
In another case the approach of the Air Transport Employees (ATE) at Western Airlines
was to provide members with all the information the union could garner, which often
conflicted diametrically with information provided to the employees by the company's
management. This approach minimized tension within the local but also minimized integrative
relations with management. However, the ATE had lost a fair amount of bargaining leverage
12
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as a result of Western's near bankruptcy, and may not have been in a position to insist on
integrative relations, given an unwilling management.
Different kinds of tensions can emerge within locals when union members have diverse
preferences regarding new quid pro quos. One example concerns the 1984 local negotiations
between the UAW and General Motors at the Lake Orion assembly plant. There, in response
to diverse preferences among the workforce, the contract allowed employees a choice between
working in a single classification at a set pay rate, and working in a flexible classification
system with pay increasing as more skills are acquired. While most employees stood to earn
more with the flexible pay system (and thus selected that system), a substantial minority of
employees chose to stay in the single classification system. In this instance, the union was
able to exact the voluntary provision from management as a quid pro quo for its concessions
in order to avoid the alienation of one or the other faction within the membership.
In sum, we find union leaders confronted with dramatic changes in both the substance
and the process of negotiations. In order to fully understand these challenges, it will be
necessary to turn to changes in union leader's roles at the workplace level and at the
strategic level.
III. UNION LEADERSHIP AT TIE WORKPIACE I,EVEI,
Between contract negotiations, union leaders have traditionally represented member'
interests by enforcing contracts through the grievance procedure and, occasionally, by serving
on joint committees. Many local leaders also informally addressed issues not dealt with by the
contract in what is sometimes referred to as "fractional bargaining" (Kuhn, 1961). In general,
however, the traditional mode has been captured by the expression "management acts and the
union reacts."
We divide this section into three parts. The first discusses the challenges and options
posed by the widespread reorganization of work and simplification of work rules at the work
place. The second concerns the various kinds of joint activity unions and management may
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chose to establish on the shop floor. Here, we pay particular attention to the potential
benefits to unions of such programs, and the ways in which unions sometimes use them as
sources of leverage to achieve gains in unrelated areas. The third part of this section
examines the concrete effects such activities have on elected and appointed union leaders.
Here, we distinguish among local officers, stewards and appointees.
.IIl. Work Rules and Work Oanization
Highly simplified work rules and substantial changes in work organization characterize
both union and non-union facilities engaged in employee involvement, flexible production,
improved product or service quality, computer aided design and manufacturing, and just-in-time
delivery arrangements. For local union leaders the associated changes in work rules and work
organization substantially complicate the representation of member's interests.
The seniority principle has long been central to the operation of union work rules and
the job-control nature of traditional collective bargaining. This principle is now threatened in
a variety of settings. There have always been tensions between the relative importance of
seniority and ability in promotions, transfers, and layoffs. Today, in determining membership
in employee involvement teams and participation in training programs and other new activities,
a third decision rule has become intertwined with these principles. This is the "voluntary
principle" where the solicitation of volunteers for an activity precedes the application of
seniority versus merit.
The voluntary principle is important where there is significant divergence of opinion
within the membership about the new approaches. Consider the example of work teams, often
formed with volunteers. Problems may arise, if there is a reduction in force, and senior
workers are forced to bid into teams in order to avoid layoff. This is exactly what has
occurred at Xerox. Voluntary team members with specific skills and working relationships feel
that their initiative should be rewarded with some protection of team integrity. Management
agrees. Labor leaders thus find themselves caught between the norm of seniority and the
stability of team structures. Case-by-case solutions, often informally arranged with
14
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management, have enabled union leaders to ease political tensions within the membership.
However, such solutions depend on both parties being willing to tolerate some variability in
how employees are utilized.
A vivid example of a debate around the voluntary nature of team forms of work
organization surfaced at General Motor's Lake Orion assembly plant. This was resolved by a
collective bargaining agreement under which workers were allowed to choose between work
teams and traditional job structures. The individuals who chose the team structure were
required to learn approximately seven jobs and received a pay premium; the individuals in
traditional classifications had only to learn two jobs. This solution has proven stable in this
case, though perhaps because a substantial majority of the workers have chosen one system
(in this case the team system).
The voluntary principle may also complicate internal promotions and transfers, since many
of the programs for which employees volunteer will improve their skills. Ford and General
Motors have both joined with the UAW to create extensive joint training programs. The
Communication Workers of America (CWA), the United Steelworkers of America (USA) and the
IAM have all also pursued large-scale initiatives of this sort with various firms. Where low
seniority employees volunteer for training programs and take active roles in employee
problem-solving groups, they may develop expectations that their efforts will be rewarded.
Then, when uninvolved high seniority employees are given preference for job moves, these
lower seniority members may question the local union's standards of equity.
For stewards, as was noted above, the short-term solution can be to do what has always
been done -- to negotiate informal arrangements with supervisors. Thus, as one employee who
works in an autonomous work group at Xerox noted: "The floor union representatives are
behind this; they back us behind the scenes, but they can't do it publicly." Sometimes the
informal approach can even be officially sanctioned. This has been the case at GM's Lake
Orion plant where, for example, the transfer of workers between the hard trim and the more
desirable soft trim areas has been officially handled by informal discussion rather than by
written work rules. Nonetheless, such informal arrangements may not be possible in cases
15
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where shop floor relations are fairly conflictual or when upper levels of management fail to
sanction this approach.
Moreover, these arrangements may leave union leaders politically vulnerable. As one
local union leader noted:
One of the hardest parts of all this is that sometimes we agree to do things that are
different than in the contract. Then you get variation. The problem is that we need
these changes in order to be competitive, but we can only hold to them so long as the
company continues to see us as an equal partner.
These problems might be resolved in part by the creation of standards about when to
allow and when not to allow variation in work practices. As one union leader put it: If a
decision involves my folks and doesn't affect anyone in their promotion track, then we will do
anything that's smarter -- but that involves lots of up-front research." Among other things,
such decisions rarely affect only small group of workers unless they are fairly unimportant.
Indeed, the scale or scope of variation can even preclude informal arrangements. Witness the
wire harness case at Xerox. The work in this production area was on the verge of being
contracted out, when the union insisted on playing a joint role in this decision, as they had
earlier with the employee involvement programs. As a result, the parties established a joint
study team, and then implemented substantial changes in work organization and a reduction in
management overhead. At the next negotiations, they agreed to language providing for a
similar study team process in all future situations involving the potential for outsourcing.
Thus, in this case the union agreed to new and different practices in certain areas of the
plant, in exchange for a significant extension of its influence over strategic (plant-level)
decisions. This case is unusual insofar as the union was powerful enough to insist on
extended joint relations at a time when its traditional bargaining leverage was weakened.
111.2. Joint Labor-Management Activities
Many local and international union leaders today are finding themselves engaged in the
joint governance of new industrial relations activities, in ways that go well beyond traditional
rule making and rule enforcement. Each one of our panel sites involved at least some form of
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joint labor-management programs, including long-standing health and safety or apprenticeship
committees; the administration of newer initiatives around Employee Involvement (El),
Statistical Process Control (SPC), training, and Employee Alcohol and Drug Assistance (EAP);
and formal joint roles in strategic decisions about product sourcing, new technology, human
resource planning and even plant and product design. In some cases, as at Western Airlines
and its four major unions, these new activities were initiated by management in order to elicit
concessions. Unions such as the UAW and the CWA however have taken the initiative in
creating such processes or programs themselves. In general both union and management
leaders still remain largely ambivalent about the cooperative implications of their joint
activities. For example, one union leader at Teamsters local 2707 (representing Western
mechanics) called the quid pro quos snake oil;" another at ATE said they "rammed the
concessions through, so they served [the company'sl purpose". Other interviews at Western's
Unions, all reveal the same predominantly functional and short- or medium-term interest in
labor-management collaboration. Thus, for union leaders, cooperation is unlikely to ever be an
end itself, but rather a means for achieving goals that are important to their members, to the
union as an organization, or to management.
For union leaders, therefore, the decision to venture into this domain can reflect an
affirmative interest in increasing the scope of union influence, a defensive response to
management efforts to build deeper employee commitment to the goals of the firm, and/or an
effort to respond to the competitive needs of the enterprise. For instance, certain ACTWU
shop chairmen at Xerox have explicitly viewed the El program as a method for enhancing
their leverage. A similar view is taken by the leadership of the ATE at Western. Other shop
chairmen at Xerox have emphasized the joint gains from El. Most also state that the program
has afforded the union an opportunity to increase the loyalty of many of its members. This is
a testament to the success of the El at Xerox.
On the defensive side of the ledger union leaders can be motivated to get involved in
joint activities by management successes with participative programs in non-union settings.
These programs can fulfill many traditional union functions, ranging from the provision of due
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process to the assessment of worker preferences. One possible indication of such an indirect
"non-union threat' can be inferred from the fact that over 10% of a sample of 156 flight
attendants at Western Airlines mentioned the attractive qualities of Delta's (largely non-union)
human resource management strategy in a completely open-ended survey section. However, the
Association of Flight Attendants (which represented these people) lacked the bargaining
leverage (and,indeed the interest) necessary to establish a joint participatory scheme. The
management in fact instituted its own limited El program without consulting the union.
Joint activities are typically structured around some form of top-level steering or
executive committee. For issues such as health and safety, employee alcohol and drug
assistance programs and training programs there is usually one or more appointees who ensure
that the mandate of the joint committee is carried out. These oversight activities are rarely
problematic for union leaders. They however require an active, rather than a merely reactive
approach. In most locations this begins with joint offsite planning sessions in which union
leaders are called upon to join in program design. Subsequently, the task of program
administration and evaluation involves activities that encompass marketing, finance, accounting,
staffing, and service delivery. Difficulties can emerge at this stage when programs fail.
Members may attribute such failure to the union, since active endorsement of joint activities
can be interpreted as an assumption of some degree of managerial responsibility.
For example, one member of the ATE at Western stated out-right that the union should
have made more concessions earlier to help the company survive, and that it should not have
insisted on costly and ineffective El training processes during a time when the company was
near bankruptcy and over 10,000 jobs were at stake. Tlhe dilemma posed by such a position
may be impossible to resolve. On the one hand, the El could only have been negotiated as a
quid pro quo for concessions, when management was hard-pressed for cash. On the other
hand, the programs were costly at a time when cost savings, not El, were viewed as saving
members' jobs. Once more, this story illustrates the ways in which the relative power
positions of the parties can shape union leaders' ability to fashion new types of
labor-management relations. The most straight forward lesson is simply that union leaders
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require a large measure of control over any joint programs with which they are closely
identified.
These tensions can be compounded by the political complexity of having a significant
percentage of union members serving in permanent or ad hoc groups. Suddenly, leadership
must not only maintain the proper involvement/distance from management, it must also must
also maintain appropriate ties with informal group leaders involved when a process of joint
activities is launched and expanded, as well as monitor the changing view of the rank and file
concerning these developments. At Budd, GM and other organizations newly established group
leaders were quick to forge close relations with stewards or committeemen. This was
particularly the case where the unions were strong to begin with. As a result, informal
groups were more successful in addressing union and workers, as well as management
priorities. Where shop-floor union leadership was weak, such ties were not forged and the
groups either became ineffective or strongly management- oriented.
Rank and file members may perceive the union to be responsible for foisting on them
joint activities they dislike or don't care about. For example, while many workers at Xerox
were willing to volunteer for EI, a substantial percentage chose not to do so. But when local
union leaders endorsed mandatory training in El principles they merely exacerbated tensions
between the two groups. A survey revealed that 88% of the employees valued the idea of
employee participation, but only about 40% wanted to participate via an El problem-solving
group. At Western, an attitude survey taken a year after the negotiation of El program
revealed that over 90% of the workers in question did not feel the programs increased their
control over their day-to-day worklives (Wever, 1986), and (consequently) there was no
indication that the union leadership gained in popularity as a result of the negotiation of the
programs. As noted above, the union was more committed to the El than the management,
but it lacked the bargaining leverage to force the rapid and thorough implementation of the
programs.
111.2.1. Advantas of Joint Activities:
Why would any local union leaders ever choose to engage in joint activities? A handful
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will do so for ideological reasons. But, given the risks, the initial choice is more often made
for defensive reasons; that is, if the union does not join in the activity, management may
attempt it independently, as with Western's flight attendants. HIowever, joint activities are
unlikely to be successful or sustained over the long run unless both parties perceive
continuing gains. Further, in some instances union leaders have found in joint processes
access to resources that would otherwise have been unavailable. These include regular
vehicles for communication with the membership during work hours -- e.g. newsletters, focus
group meetings, and presentations to the entire workforce -- all of which may become far
easie o arrange. We have observed this at Xerox, Alcoa, General Motors and Goodyear.
In order to maintain independence, local officers have stressed the importance of
separate communications with the membership before they take on new, joint responsibilities,
as well as regular and continuing communications. This kind of information sharing can be
used to help the union gain credit for its involvement and influence. Irving Bluestone, who
serves as a union representative on the board of directors of Weirton Steel, briefs union
stewards after every board meeting so they in turn can brief the membership. Bluestone and
other union leaders have also used such briefings to make it clear that confidential decisions
will arise in such forums, and that some decisions and outcomes are beyond the control of
union representatives.
Through increased information sharing and joint activities, some local union leaders
claim, as one individual put it, that they can serve the majority of the membership between
negotiations, rather than just the five percent of individuals that typically file grievances."
Indeed, there are some aspects of the joint services for which the union is better suited than
is management. These include conferring legitimacy on the program (which is critical, for
example, in a program such as alcohol assistance), being able to speak for the membership,
and insuring that members benefit from the program. To the extent that these and other
union roles help ensure the success of joint programs, participation may even afford the local
union with a new source of leverage -- which is the ability to hold the particular program
"hostage," a subject to which we now turn.
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H1.22. Participation and Union Power
Sometimes, unions can exert power in joint activities simply by withholding support for a
decision in a joint committee, or by withdrawing from joint activities altogether. The ACTWU
at Xerox was able to exercise the latter kind of leverage when it felt that management had
violated the joint program's basic principles. The union's leadership learned of unilateral
management plans to subcontract union jobs after participative efforts had been underway for
about two years. The local union leadership felt compelled to threaten to withdraw from the
QWL process, thereby halting the subcontracting. Shortly afterwards, a second protest of a
management subcontracting decision -- this time involving 180 jobs -- was met with a unique
response, which was an agreement to establish a joint study team to examine the issue.
The Xerox/ACTWU study team did in fact find cost savings sufficient to keep the work
in house. Moreover, in the next negotiations the parties formally agreed to extend, in the
future, the principle of joint decision making to all potential outsourcing decisions. Since
then, there have been five additional study teams created. All but one of these has been able
to keep the bulk of the work in question in house.
In another of our sites, the union withdrew from joint activities over a dispute
concerning health benefits. In this case, the union's linkage of El with the health benefits
issue angered members who valued the EI. This case then illustrates the limits to the
leverage union leaders can gain through such linkage.
The threat to withdraw from joint activities can also undermine the trust that is often
critical to the success of joint efforts. In the case of Alcoa, management understood the
1r ical pressures that forced union leaders to withdraw from the employee participation
steering committee after deep labor concessions were granted. But while both parties saw the
reason behind the program failure, they still found it necessary to restructure it and begin
new activities only gradually, in order to restore the necessary trust among the joint partners.
In any case, the leverage that may be gained from linking some joint program to other issue
areas is limited to issues that are clearly of importance to a majority of the membership.
Similarly, the negative repercussions of injecting such power plays into joint arrangement may
21
not be worth it. The most effective use of such leverage is probably the affirmative type
which can expand the agenda of joint activities. As illustrated in the Xerox-ACTWU case, the
union can in this way gain control over issues formerly in the purview of management.
111.3. The Effects on the Grievance Process
For local leaders who traditionally handle grievances joint activities present a special
challenge because issues that might previously have been channelled through the grievance
procedure now arise in the joint structure. Where QWL facilitators, groups leaders, and
others associated with the joint activities are sensitive to this shift (after all, stewards are
elected to their posts), some of the difficulties can be minimized -- but not eliminated.
There are also problems associated with the reduction in the number of grievances and
changes in the nature of grievances that accompany work place participation efforts. While
grievances are still filed, typically, more are resolved verbally and informally at early stages
in the resolution process. Those that are filed tend to concern issues that are particularly
difficult to resolve. As the grievance procedure becomes more limited in scope, the result is
a potentially more contentious system. Union stewards often run for office, in part, out of a
commitment to handling members' grievances. But the circumscribing of their function by
other forums can cast doubt on their raison d'etre.
Different problems face the rapidly growing number of appointees. In one of the plants
we studied we interviewed a group of stewards and a group of appointees. The stewards
identified the following ten major barriers to fulfilling their responsibilities (in priority order):
"concessions", "negative floor attitudes", low trust", "misinformation", lies", "shut down
threat", "limited time for union business (for part-time stewards)", "sidetracking from real
issues", "malagement's combining of jobs", and "anti-union and anti-company sentiments among
employees". When asked what made it possible for them to fulfill their responsibilities, given
these barriers, they could only identify three factors: "belief in what we are doing (i.e. we
don't want to see the union any weaker)", "ability to pressure supervisors", and "having time
to process grievances". In other words, very little beyond their own personal commitment
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sustained them in their work. The consequence (in this location and in many others in this
study) was a high degree of 'bum-out" among these individuals. The decision of one union
leader to not run for re-election was explained as follows: "lie is just tired of trying to fight
the good fight."
The experiences of the union appointees serving as facilitators for the same plant's joint
employee involvement/communications groups were quite different. These El appointees
identified well over a dozen factors sustaining them in their work, ranging from support by
the union leadership", to "shared concern over the plant's survival", "changes in leadership
style among some managers", and changes in employee attitudes". This divergence in role
orientation suggests that stewards may become increasingly isolated, and may resent joint
efforts associated with changes in management, the involvement of employees, and the
organization of work. All of these changes de-emphasize their traditional role of contract
enforcement.
In some UAW-GM plants, as well as elsewhere, the role of committeemen (a combination
of steward and bargaining committee member) has been officially redefined. These individuals
serve as facilitators to help groups of employees solve problems informally. In these plants
committeemen can still write grievances, at least in theory. In practice, they rarely do,
especially since the contract in these settings is usually fairly simple. In other settings, such
as Xerox and ACTWU, where the role of the shop chairman has generally not been redefined
formally, these individuals are given the latitude to develop new representational roles on
their own.
The labor leaders who appear to be coping most effectively with these diverse new
challenges did not start out with a clear vision about their new roles. Rather, they have
allowed their basic values about joint processes to guide their behavior at various critical
junctures when it became necessary to make some form of unfamiliar adaptation. At every
such point, union leaders must make decisions about whether and how to develop new roles
and functions. Those who agree to joint activities and are willing to contemplate changes in
work organization have come to discover the complexities and risks of proactive, mixed
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(formal and informal) approaches to their jobs. The alternative may be simply to cede the
initiative to management, though perhaps ruling out the possibility that the union might
benefit from new joint activities. All of these trade-offs force appointees into a continuous
balancing act, requiring considerable internal organizational restructuring and the redefinition
of their respective roles.
IV. UNION LEADE:RSIIIP AT TIL:f STRATEGIC LEVEL
Although strategic business decisions often have important implications for unions and
their members, they have traditionally been beyond the reach of union leaders. Indeed,
current labor law limits the ability of unions to exert influence in such decisions. There have
been instances of collaboration at this level in the past. For example, many companies and
unions in the textile and garment industries in the 1930s jointly engaged in product
development and marketing (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1985; .Tacoby, 1982). Another example is the
modernization and mechanization agreement in the West Coast longshoring industry is
(Hartman, 1969). Still, such cases have been rare. More typically, union involvement at this
level has been a matter of informal information sharing.
For many years, for example, Xerox and ACTWUJ have engaged in informal, top-level
discussions of the firm's business plans. Both sides agree this arrangement has ensured that
the human resource implications of strategic management decisions have been considered
earlier then might otherwise have been the case. The arrangement rested, of course, on a
clear understanding that the union would keep the information confidential and would not use
it against the company in collective bargaining. It also hinged on a combination of
management's unusual degree of willingness to let the union in at this level, and the union's
capacity to convince management that doing so would benefit both parties.
With the re-emergence of concession bargaining, financial information sharing has become
much more common. Unions have also been granted various forms of stock ownership, seats
on boards of directors, and other formal and informal roles at the strategic level. At one
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extreme are cases like the UAW-GM Saturn agreement, where the union is involved in
strategic decisions about new technology, work organization, and ongoing plant operations. At
the other extreme are cases like the relationship between the Association of Flight Attendant
and Western Airlines, where board membership, stock ownership, profit-sharing, a wide-ranging
Health Services Program and informal information sharing all reflected purely formal, rather
than substantive union involvement in strategic management. In this section we consider the
factors underlying these different patterns.
IV. 1. Uncharted Terrain
While, increased union involvement at the worksite level can be complex, at least it
takes place in a context familiar to union leaders. By contrast, the strategic level is
generally unfamiliar territory. Consequently, the last half-do7en years have seen a remarkable
diversity of approaches to relations at this level. For example, at Western Airlines, the four
unions that acquired seats on the board of directors made very different choices in how to fill
those seats. The Teamsters chose an outsider" with extensive experience in the international
labor movement and on other boards of directors. The rationale for this choice, as articulated
by the IBT's Chief Economist, is that in the board room the members' interests are best
scrved by someone with the experience to increase the company's competitive position. Local
Teamster officials at Western valued this board member's standing and reputation, which they
said allowed him to bring that experience to bear on the board's policies and decisions. Such
an approach also has the political benefit of protecting union leaders from being identified
with business decisions that may be unpopular with members.
The Air Line Pilots Association, on the other hand, chose a rank-and-file pilot to sit on
Western's board. Local union officials explain their choice in terms of this individual's more
than twenty years of on-line experience at Western. The board member himself argued that
boards of directors typically lack the kind of "hands on" knowledge of airline operations that
a pilot can bring to strategic decision making. One of his early contributions was to suggest
how Western could increase charter operations to utilize aircraft on the back side of the
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clock" (when planes would normally be grounded). This was adopted, and raised revenues
substantially while also allowing the company to call back furloughed pilots.
Both the ATE and the AFA board members at Western were the top leaders of their
unions. While the AFA Master Executive Council Chain remained largely aloof from this role,
the ATE's president viewed his directorship as critical to protecting his members' interests.
He argued that since the members had made substantial financial and work rule concessions,
it was important for him as a union leader to ensure that the board not undertake any actions
that might impose further hardships on the rank-and-file. This ATE position reflected the
view that if union members were to make material sacrifices for the sake of the company's
financial standing, then the members should receive direct quid pro quos. For instance, the
ATE also insisted on the parallel development of workplace participation programs -- in
addition to a board seat, profit sharing and stock ownership.
The advocacy of worker involvement carries considerable political risk. Because the ATE
president openly proclaimed that he had to force the programs on management, their failure to
meet members' expectations might have endangered his leadership. This political quandary is
double-edged: if union leaders with access at the strategic level do not urge worksite level
programs, this chances of making a real contribution at either level is diminished; but if the
two levels are linked, then a problem in one forum can disrupt progress in the other.
Involvement at the strategic level raises critical questions concerning how to structure
these new roles and what further leverage they might bring to union leaders. The experience
at Western suggests that these choices reflect different conceptions of the appropriate role of
the union. t is not clear what the long term implications of these different choices might
be. In any case, Western has in the mean time been acquired by Delta. What is clear is that
these four unions dealt quite differently with a complex set of dilemmas at the strategic level.
Relations at the strategic level are not only unknown terrain for union leaders, they are
also quite distant from the daily experiences of the membership. For example, where union
members have been polled on their priorities, immediate economic benefits are consistently
much more valued than board membership (Wever 1986). Yet member's demands and preferences
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may not give sufficient weight to the union's long-term institutional security. Consequently,
union leaders may have to choose between acting on members' immediate interests, on the one
hand, and taking the political risk of pursuing unpopular (and unfamiliar) courses of action, on
the other. Dealing with this type of situation will require union leaders to spend considerable
time and energy informing the membership of the reasons for pursuing this approach.
This dilemma is not new. For example, the first UAW contracts to include pension
benefits were rejected in some of the initial balloting in favor of short-term pay increases
(Howe and Widick, 1949). Today, however, it is not just a matter of selling an alternative
benefit, but of building support for new union roles whose effects are highly uncertain. But
because union leaders must attend to the institutional security of the union, involvement in
the strategic realm should not occur simply in reaction to management's initiatives in
collective bargaining. Rather, the circumstances call for an active strategy.
IV.2. Union Leaders Operating at the Strategic I mel
The lack of an effective plan of action at the strategic level can render a union quite
vulnerable. The Diesel Workers Union learned this lesson when Cummins Engine management,
in an effort to forestall a hostile take-over, imposed an across the board layoff of about ten
percent of the workforce. The union had come to expect that there would be no layoffs, and
this expectation had been important in sustaining various plant-level collaborative efforts.
The leadership therefore saw no alternative but to withdraw from the joint programs. In this
case, the lack of union access to top management, not only cost jobs, but also may have
diminished the ability of both parties to deal with each other effectively in areas of common
concern.
The strategic roles of the four unions Western Airlines were created primarily because
the carrier was in crisis and granted these roles as quid pro quos for concessions. Only one
of the unions (ATE) had made such involvement a part of its bargaining agenda. Once they
had such access, only the ATE turned its role at the strategic level into a key part of its
overall program. The ATE, however, lacked the strategic leverage to implement its workplace
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level participation programs effectively. Therefore, it is not surprising that on the whole the
accomplishments of these unions at the strategic level have been fairly limited.
By contrast, the IAM at Boeing identified one strategy area -- investment in new
technology -- in which it did actively and successfully pursue access to information and
decision making. In this way the union was able to garner membership support, since the
outcomes of the introduction of new technologies are highly visible. This is especially true
when (as in this case) laid off workers are brought back to work as a result of the union's
involvement in a program providing additional training. In other words, the union was able to
demonstrate tangibly the value of its new efforts to the members, and to help equip workers
with the tools necessary in their changing jobs. One important determinant of the IAM's
success in this regard was the fact that it possessed the leverage vis-a-vis management to
carve out an effective role in the strategic domain. In this respect the IAM's situation
clearly differs from that of the ATE at Western Airlines.
Single-issue approaches like that of the IAM have also been successfully employed by the
ACTWU and Xerox. The procedure for establishing a six-month study team to investigate
alternatives to outsourcing discussed above ensured union influence over this set of investment
decisions. Similarly, when the company was considering the construction of a new plant for
the manufacture of toner (a black talc-like substance used in copiers), a joint design team
ensured union input at an early stage of this process. Ultimately, the plant was built in a
location preferred by the union, and incorporated design improvements suggested by hourly
workers. Beyond this, the parties have been staffing joint teams engaged in new product
development. A special joint horizon team has also been established to anticipate future
human resource planning. All of these joint, strategic-level activities have provided returns
that are of value to the members. The benefits are also highly visible, especially because
membership on the joint teams is not limited to top-level union leaders. Success in this
instance, as with the IAM at Boeing, hinged on the union's ability to isolate a substantively
linked series of issues and develop a plan to deal with precisely the issues. In both cases,
then, it was a combination of sufficient leverage vis-a-vis management and a clear and
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pro-active strategy that sustained meaningful union participation in high-level business
decisions.
Yet a half-dozen years ago the ACTWU local at Xerox did not have a comprehensive
organizational strategy encompassing its current full range of activities. The union's roles at
this level have evolved substantially over time. Initially, the union hoped the El program
would meet member interests and help improve the competitive posture of Xerox, but the
assumption was that the program would remain a narrowly focused adjunct to collective
bargaining. As the number of new volunteers for employee involvement dwindled, the parties
started considering ways to preserve and enhance employment security, information sharing at
all levels, ways to shift management styles, extensions of cooperative problem solving and
long-range planing. Some of these explorations took place in the context of collective
bargaining; others occurred in discussions entirely separate from traditional labor-management
processes. In all instances, regular communication with management and monitoring of
members' views were important elements of the union's approach.
Even today the union has not embraced all forms of activity at the strategic level. For
example, the General Secretary of the local union is still reluctant to join the plant
management team on a formal basis, for fear that his members might perceive him to be
supporting business decisions that may have short run negative effects on the members. What
is important about the ACTWU experience is not just the new strategic agenda, but the
gradual learning which has accompanied and supported the realization of that agenda. Both
sides have gradually come to trust each other, and the union has established the areas in
which it has a distinctive competence. Each step has also involved internal struggles within
the company and the union, as well as between the two.
Certainly not all managers favor broadening the roles and influence of union leaders, and
not all union stewards or officers favor expansion of such integrative interaction with
management. Thus, union access to the strategic level will always depend on a willingness to
experiment continuously, and to learn from experience. The experiences of the UAW and GM
illustrate this process. GM had historically framed a strong management rights policy and
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opposed union involvement at the strategic level. Then, in the 1970's, the union successfully
pressured the company to abandon its Southern Strategy" of opening new non-union plants in
the South. The UAW thereby established the principle that it can influence such decisions, in
part by threatening to withdraw from QWL. The parties then began to gradually expand the
range of joint strategic level initiatives.
The Fiero plant is one of a number of facilities where UAW workers have been involved
in important design decisions about how best to configure the plant. This plant has only half
the typical complement of supervisors. Its work design uses many team principles. Most
importantly, key local union leaders are included on the plant manager's administrative team.
Today, there are few management decisions that do not involve the local union. In return,
the plant manager can attend local union meetings.
One reason why the parties have been able to fashion this new governance system is
that the union had been shocked by the closure of the Pontiac assembly plant. The workers
at Fiero were self-selected; they took their jobs only after undergoing a detailed orientation
explaining the new work arrangements. Ultimately, the system works because over time it has
allowed both labor and management gains from the system by pursuing the common interests
and resolving their various differences. That is, the arrangement has benefitted not only the
company -- through its flexibility -- but also the union -- by giving it greater control over
the environment in which the rank-and-file work and over the long term direction of the
plant.
To the extent that union involvement at the strategic level does empower the union and
its members, it may then be possible to build on that experience and to expand such
involvement. owever, success may hinge on the union's application of various forms of
power even as it demonstrates commitment to collaborate relations. Long term success also
appears to require that both parties have an adaptive, learning approach to their shifting
relation. Successes must also be translated into visible and tangible benefits for rank-and-file
members, and accompanied by continuous communications about the value of union involvement
at this level of management decision making.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We believe that today's labor leaders have little choice but to take on new roles. The
very survival of American unions requires that they adapt. There are clearly many possible
routes to such adaptation, however, as we have tried to illustrate here. Different
circumstances require different adjustments in how union leaders represent their members'
interests. We have also sought to highlight the fact that most of the experiences cited here
show union leaders in a reactive, rather than a proactive posture. It is our hope that the
experiences herein described provide the outlines of a more active strategy.
In this section we briefly summarize the data discussed above, and we propose some
general features of such a new and proactive model of union leadership. The presentation will
be highly prescriptive, though each piece of this model derives from the adaptive response of
one or more of the union leaders involved in this study. As such, the composite picture we
sketch pulls together different adaptive mechanisms that have already been forged by a variety
of contemporary U.S. union leaders. We believe these adaptive responses can help with the
transformation of American industrial relations so as to serve the interests not only of union
members, but also of the firms and industries in which they work.
V.I. General Theme
Any period of social and institutional transition is associated with a great deal of
uncertainty, internal debate, conflict and resistance to change. This is the world of today's
union leader who is often confronted with changing markets, new technologies, shifting
management and industrial relations practices, and a membership that is uncertain, often
'divided, and fearful of the consequences of change. In this environment the political cohesion
and organizational solidarity of unions requires union leaders to apply considerable skill in
strategic thinking and planning, communicating with and educating the membership, and
extending participation principles to the process of internal union administration. To manage
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a period of internal debate and conflict, union leaders must articulate the long run interests
of the union and its membership and actively communicate that strategic vision to members.
The principles of participation and communication will have to engage the entire spectrum of
union members and activists. Without such broad-based involvement, internal union politics
are likely to focus on the demands of a small but vocal (and probably unrepresentative)
constituency that forms around narrow and short term problems with adjustments to the
labor-management relationship.
In the past the agenda and frequency of union leaders' interactions with management
have enerally been highly programmed by the timetable for contract negotiations, grievance
meetings and joint committee meetings initiated by management. This pattern has cast union
leaders in a reactive mode. The cases examined here suggest that this pattern has been
carried over into the current period. Management has initiated most of the changes occurring
in contemporary industrial relations. Union leaders have been brought into the change process
only some of the time. This reactive posture no longer suits the long run interests of unions
or their members. For today's union leaders to have a significant impact on the management
policies and practices that influence the short and long run interests of workers, they must
actively pursue and achieve a broader and more continuous pattern of interaction with key
management decision-makers. For unions to influence the issues of the day rather than react
to an agenda shaped solely by management, their leaders must be proactive. To illustrate
these points more concretely we now summarize the changes in leadership roles occurring at
each of the three tiers of industrial activity introduced earlier.
V. . . Collective Bargaining:
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie's (1986) Transformation presents clear evidence that union
members have generally evaluated their unions and union leaders favorably with respect to
their ability to achieve gains on material "bread and butter" issues in collective bargaining.
Indeed - is has generally been one of the primary performance criteria to which members
hold Cth:r leaders accountable. Union leaders are therefore confronted with a serious problem
in an environment in which it is difficult to achieve significant short run economic gains at
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the bargaining table. The challenge is to achieve those material gains that are still possible
in the short run, while repositioning the wage and benefit bargaining strategy to promote
income security and gains in the longer run. To do this, union leaders are increasingly
focusing on new ways to promote employment security and introducing various forms of
contingent compensation and arrangements to share the benefits of increased productivity,
and/or profitability over the longer run.
However, given the expected rapid pace of technological change and organizational
restructuring, union leaders also need to bring to the bargaining table proposals that lessen
the vulnerability of their members to future changes and developments. Central to this task
is the expansion of training opportunities for workers. For example, the UAW negotiated for
human resource centers with GM and Ford in 1982, when the auto industry was experiencing
its worst economic performance since the 1930s. New contract language on technological
change negotiated by the IAM and the Professional Engineers' Union with Boeing, illustrates
another unconventional and future-oriented collective bargaining. More generally new ways of
funding and delivering training opportunities and dealing with technology can allow unions to
deliver valued collective goods to their members.
In addition to broadening the substantive agenda in bargaining, union leaders must press
for continued, on-going communications with management, rather than simply communicating
during a crisis. In general, management responded to the severe economic pressures of the
early 1980s by proposing early negotiations and the opening of contracts, sharing information
on financial performance, and encouraging more open communications with rank and file
workers. Management also moved to decentralize the structure of bargaining to bring it
closer to the problems of specific workplaces. If these features are sustained and
institutionalized as part of the standard approach to negotiations, union leaders will then gain
ongoing access to both the necessary information and the management decision-makers that
can help solve problems affecting their members. What management initiated as a short-run
response to crisis should be transformed into ongoing practices to raise issues affecting
members' interests in a timely fashion in ways that are directly visible to rank and file
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members, and that involve those workers, union leaders, and management representatives who
are directly affected. We can expect this institutionaliz.ation of "new industrial relations"
particularly where natural opportunities for change arise during the life of an agreement.
These include the introduction of new technology, the retrofitting of a work unit or entire
plant, and the design of new work systems in new facilities. If union leaders can insist on
maintaining the principles management introduced to cope with crisis, Walter Reuther's goal of
making the collective bargaining agreement a living document" will be attained.
V.1.2. Workplace:
Union members generally think their leaders are effective at handling grievances. This
high level of performance must remain a high priority. owever, given the range of activities
involving employee participation, work redesign, the introduction of new technology and
quality control and improvement. the roles played by many union leaders at the workplace
have recently expanded enormously. Surveys of both union and nonunion workers consistently
show them to be very concerned with these workplace activities, since they have direct and
visible effects on employees' immediate worklives. Therefore, union members are likely to
hold leaders accountable for responding to members' interests in these areas.
Most of these new workplace initiatives have been introduced as discreet and distinct
management experiments, only in some cases with union support or participation. As some of
the cases discussed above show, and as we argue in our companion report on the
institutionalization of industrial relations innovations, the long-term success of these efforts
requires that such participative principles be integrated into standard practices at the
workplace. These experiments must be transformed into standard operating procedures. Union
leadership will be critical in encouraging and even insisting that the principles of meaningful
participation and problem solving be applied to the full range of issues affecting workers' job
experience. The risk of failing to do so is that management will maintain control over the
agenda and scope of participatory activities. tinder these circumstances such activities are
not very likely to be institutionalized into everyday practice, and union leaders will be forced
to share the blame with management for the demise of yet another passing fad.
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In short, as noted in the companion report, we expect that we will see continued
expansion of joint union-management activities at the workplace level. As this occurs, union
leaders will need to insure that the joint activities not only address worker interests, but also
produce tangible benefits for workers. In sum, the job of the union leader will be to ensure
effective worker input and participation in such areas as the introduction of new technology,
new investments and a range of other changes being introduced at the workplace.
V.1.3. Strategic Ievel:
It is clearly true that rank and file workers do not generally place a high priority on
union involvement at the strategic level. Nor do they give union leaders high marks for
performance in this arena. We think this will change. Strategic-level interactions are
extremely important to the long-run interests of workers, since they are critical to the
viability of the enterprise itself. Union leaders will need to have access to strategic decisions
concerning plant location, investment and general business strategy in order to represent
members' interests effectively. But workers cannot be expected simply to recognize the
importance of union involvement at this level. Consequently this is one of the areas in which
we hope to see greater experimentation and worker education.
Considerably more experience is needed (and if present trends are any indication this
experience will be forthcoming), before it will be possible to prescribe the new roles to be
played here. We can cite examples where unions have had access to some decisions, only to
be cut out when some really major issue (such as a merger or corporate takeover) develops.
Over the long run, this pattern will be fatal to union leaders' credibility. It will reinforce
traditional arguments against unions making any effort to gain a stronger role at this level of
managerial decision-making. We hope, therefore, that out of the current and future
experiments with various forms of information sharing, consultation, and formal representation
will emerge a set of accepted principles for guiding union leaders in their strategic
interactions with management. More than in other areas, however, management will resist
union leaders' involvement in this realm and members will at best be apathetic.
In some cases management will reject union involvement in this area. In some cases,
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like that of the UAW in the auto industry, unions will be powerful enough to compel
recognition of their role at the strategic level. Ultimately, the relationship at the strategic
level must be open and trusting, or union leaders will find themselves left out of important
strategic decisions that affect them and their members.
V.2. Beyond the Firm's Boundaries
So far the focus has been on union leadership roles within a given firm or establishment.
But unions derive part of their power and their collective influence over individual firms
through their roles at the industry, occupation, and national policy making levels. However,
the means used to achieve influence at these levels may need to change in several important
respects.
American unions have traditionally had their greatest influence at the industry or
occupation level by stabilizing wages and other conditions of employment among competing
firms through centralized or pattern bargaining structures, and by organizing a high
percentage of the industry's or occupation's workforce. These sources of power have become
severely limited in many industries. In these cases unions need to find new ways to avoid the
erosion of wages and other labor standards, as individual firms seek to gain competitive
advantages through low labor costs. No clear strategies for replacing these traditional
mechanisms have yet emerged among the unions we have studied. Iowever, ALPA's renewed
efforts to centralize approval of new contract terms suggests a starting point. Centralized
coordinating and policy making activities will undoubtedly grow in importance within and
among unions in order to cope with these problems (Katz and Sabel, 1985).
Unions will not be able to unilaterally stabilize and improve labor standards within
industries. The strengthening of internal coordination and policy making is only a first step.
New institutions for interacting with employers (both union and nonunion) at an industry level
are called for. Unions must now engage employers at the industry level in discussions of
basic industry policies that affect investments, the development and use of new technology,
competitive strategies, and employee training and adjustment policies. Unions in the garment
36
and textile industries provide models for this type of activity. A contemporary example is the
Taylored Clothing Technology Corporation, a joint union-management technology development
project that designs and manufactures new machinery for use in the industry (see Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie, 1986; pp. 187-89). Two other contemporary examples are the Joint Labor-
Management Committee in the retail food industry and the International Masonry Institute, a
joint union management organization that promotes research and development and other
activities to strengthen this industry. Unions have just as large a stake in these activities as
employers. Yet unless more unions take the initiative in creating and promoting such joint
industry-level programs, decisions will continue to be made by employers without a strong
voice representing worker interests.
At the national level, unions will continue to play their historic roles of coordinating
labor's role in political affairs. Unions' effectiveness at the firm and industry levels will be
even more dependent in the future on labor's influence in political affairs. Standing alone,
collective bargaining will often be incapable of coping with the intensified pressures of
international and domestic competition, and with rapid changes in technology and industry
structures. This heightens the importance of gaining a voice in the political processes that
shape national and state economic, trade, human resource, and labor policies. abor must
articulate its own vision of strategies for strengthening the competitiveness of the American
economy so as to enhance the employment opportunities and the standard of living of
American workers.
V.3. The Fundamental Need For Independence
Much of the foregoing analysis has described and advocated labor's closer identification
with the management agenda. This implies substantially more integrative bargaining. By
contrast, most of the post-war period has been characterized by a dominance of distributive
bargaining. Integrative bargaining has been present only in special, time-bound situations.
Unions' stake in the viability of the firms whose workers they represent cannot in any
way undermine the independence of workers' organizations. Success will depend on the ability
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to balance adjustments to competitive pressures with the need to maintain active and separate
representation of rank and file interests. Many conflicts of interests will continue to arise
between workers, management, and stockholders. For this reason, and for the many others
suggested throughout this monograph, union leaders' success in dealing with their new and
changing roles will depend in the first instance on their proactive approach to the issues of
the day.
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